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Introduction
Yardstick Competition has been widely examined over the past decade. Interaction between politicians and voters is characterised by delegation of decision-making power, which constitutes a principal-agent-relationship with voters being the principals and politicians being their agents. O¢ cials'…scal behavior is in ‡uenced by a competitive relationship to their counterparts in similar regions because voters compare …scal policy outcomes between jurisdictions on the same federal level. Uncertainty about own quality in relation to that of other politicians constrains political rentseeking. This e¤ect is reenforced by increased transparency in the political process, since the availability of information about …scal policy outcomes advances the citizens'ability to monitor political behavior. Yardstick Competition was introduced by scholars like Baiman and Demski (1980) , Holmstroem (1982) and Shleifer (1985) as a means to increase e¢ ciency of …rms in monopolistic markets by reducing informational asymmetries. By looking at similar enterprises, the regulator is able to better assess the monopolists cost structure, thereby establishing an indirect competition between the managers of these …rms. Besley and Case (1995) transferred the idea to the …eld of public economics. In a seminal contribution, they show that yardstick competition can detain politicians to set tax rates above their e¢ cient levels. 1 The relationship between voters and politicians resembles that between owners and managers of the same …rm. Voters acquire information to evaluate their politicians by looking at …scal outcomes in similar jurisdictions. Authors like Belle ‡amme and Hindriks (2005), Besley and Smart (2007) , Bordignon et al. (2004) , Wrede (2001) or Seabright (1996) point out that at least in some circumstances, yardstick competition can have positive welfare e¤ects by reducing predatory behavior of government o¢ cials. These theoretical predictions have been widely tested on a vast amount of datasets mostly of municipal data. In general, the existence of yardstick competition should lead to spatial autocorrelation in …scal variables. If voters compare …scal outcomes in their own jurisdiction to those in similar jurisdictions, one presumes that values of …scal variables of municipalities with a similar economic structure show a stronger correlation than values of municipalities that do not resemble each other as closely. Spatial autocorrelation can be detected using spatial econometric methods, the foundations of which are thoroughly described in Anselin (1988) . A simple implementation of the concept of similarity in the local public …nance context is to compare …scal variables of contiguous municipalities as opposed to values of jurisdictions that do not share a border.
Evidence for spatial autocorrelation in public expenditures of American states is presented by Case et al. (1993) , Kelejian and Robinson (1993) , Saavedra (2000) and Figlio et al. (1999) . On the revenue side, Ladd (1992) detects signi…cant spatial dependence between American county taxes, and Brueckner and Saavedra (1997) con…rm these results for American municipalities. More recent analyses of tax policy setting in various countries point in the same direction, as Heyndels and Vuchelen (1997) demonstrate for Belgian, Brett and Pinske (2000) for Canadian, Edmark and Agren (2008) for Swedish, Revelli (2002b) for British and Solé-Ollé (2003) for Spanish local authorities.
In this paper, I present a model, in which the welfare losses caused by the principal-agent relationship between voters and politicians is attenuated by the presence of yardstick competition. The analysis draws on earlier work by Revelli (2002a) . It extends his approach by using probabilistic voting to directly show the e¤ect of increased transparency concerning …scal policy outcomes on rent-seeking of sel…sh politicians.
To prove the existence of yardstick competition, one has to disentangle the effect from spatial correlation caused by other factors. Neighboring municipalities are likely to be characterised by the same structural conditions, both in economic and geographic terms. It seems reasonable to assume that these entities are a¤ected in the same way by economic downturns or structural change. To separate the e¤ect of strategic …scal policy setting caused by yardstick competition from in ‡uences of the general economic circumstances on political behavior, it is possible to use unique institutional features of the political process. Revelli (2006) interprets a drop in the magnitude of spatial correlation in social service expenditure of British lower and upper tier federal authorities caused by the introduction of Social Service Performance Rating as a proof of the existence of yardstick competition. He argues that increased transparency enhanced voters'ability to evaluate their incumbents quality more directly. They did not have to rely as much on information from outside their own jurisdiction, which made politicians look at their neighbors expenditure policy to a lesser extent. Bivand and Szymanski (1997) examine the impact of a change in contracting regulations of the British garbage collection industry and …nd evidence for e¢ ciency gains through yardstick competition enhancing policies. Besley and Case (1995) make use of the fact that American governors face binding term limits. In the presence of yardstick competition e¤ects, spatial correlation should only be observed in states where the current government aims for reelection. Applying instrumental variables regression methods, the authors show that this is indeed the case. Bordignon et al. (2003) also use binding term limits of Italian mayors as the means to separate yardstick competition from simple tax mimicking. They …nd positive evidence for the presence of yardstick competition. Revelli (2001) examines tax setting behavior in British counties and districts and points out that tax setting follows a spatial pattern within one federal tier, but not in between governmental tiers. Allers and Elhorst (2005) identify a di¤erence in tax mimicking behavior between dutch municipalities where the government is backed by a large majority compared to governments that are less likely to be con…rmed in o¢ ce. Revelli and Tovmo (2007) show that sta¤ in Norwegian local administrations compare the results of their own public projects with those of neighboring jurisdictions. Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) use popularity equations to show the existence of yardstick competition in Belgian municipalities. They regress the vote share of the incumbent party on the jurisdictions tax rate and the neighboring jurisdictions'tax rates. Since the own tax rate shows a negative e¤ect on the vote share while the neighbors' tax rates have a positive impact, the authors conclude that yardstick competition plays a role in the tax setting behavior of local authorities in Belgium.
In line with the approach of Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) , this paper investigates the e¤ect of several local government expenditure and revenue aggregates and their spatial lags on the election results of the party in o¢ ce during the past legislative period.
The course of the analysis is the following: Section 2 presents a simple model of probabilistic voting in the context of a two-tiered federal state. Section 3 describes the empirical implementation of the model's implications and describes the dataset used in the analysis. Section 4 provides the results of the estimations and Section 5 concludes.
Rent-seeking in local jurisdictions
Consider an economy of n municipalities where the representative individual delegates decision-making-power to a politician who does not maximize social welfare but follows his own agenda. The representative voter derives utility from private and public consumption. Private consumption consists of his endowment which is normalized to unity less a lump-sum tax it , levied by the local government i in period t. Public consumption is determined by the provision of a local public good
Out of the taxrevenue, the incumbent politician …nances the public good, personal rents r it and a general economic cost shock it > 0, which is randomly determined. The amount of the provision of the public good is …xed, g t . This resembles the fact, that a signi…cant amount of local public expenditure is determined by state or federal law, which cannot be in ‡uenced by local politicians. 2 The politician can divert money from the tax revenue in form of personal political rents. For the representative individual, these rents constitute outright waste since they directly lower the amount of private consumption. r it cannot be observed by the voters, constituting an informational advantage of the poltician. The government budget constraint has the form
where it displays the …scal consequences of a negative economic shock, which cannot be observed by the voters. If municipality i is hit by a negative shock, the tax rate has to rise in order to …nance the same amount of the public good and personal rents. In the eyes of the voter, political rents are a normally distributed random variable with expected value E(r t ) = 0 and variance 2 r . Likewise, it is a normally distributed random variable with expected value E( it ) = 0 and variance 2 which decreases the …nancial margin of the politician. Personal rents are the only choice variable of the politician. Tax rates are indirectly determined, once the value of the economic shock is apparent. 3 The economic shock constitutes the informational disadvantage of the voters. Since they observe the tax rates they pay and know about the amount of public goods the incumbent is forced to provide, they are aware of overpayments of public output. However, they cannot distinguish whether this overpayment is caused by negative economical in ‡uences (positve it ) or rent-seeking polititians (positive r it ). This gives governmental decisionmakers the opportunity to use public funds for personal bene…t without being detected and punished in the elections. r it und it are statistically independent. The incumbent's utility function can be expressed as
The incumbent politician derives utility by extracting personal rents from the public budget. In period 1, he gets a direct bene…t from his rentseeking activities. In period 2 overall rents are discounted by the reelection probability of the incumbent, p I , and a discount factor . While r 2 denotes the personal rents taken out of the tax revenue, R corresponds to an ego rent the incumbent enjoys by simply holding o¢ ce in period 2. If there is no chance of being reelected (p I = 0), the incumbent will provide the institutionally determined amount of the public good and will maximise r 1 by setting maximum taxes in period 1 ( = 1). This predatory behaviour is reduced by the politician's incentive to win the election to receive period 2 rents. A contiguous municipality j is identical to i with respect to the parameters of the stochastic variables'distributions, the pool of politicians the incumbent and his opponent are drawn from and the institutional features of the political process. The realised values of i , j , r i and r j thus di¤er from each other. Voters in jurisdiction i are able to observe tax rates in municipality j, j , and know the amount of public good provided, because it matches the amount their own government has to provide. Voters use information to reduce the informational advantage of their incumbent politician. 
Voters'Expectations
Political rents r i cannot be observed by the inhabitants. They know the amount of taxes they pay and the amount of public good provided, as well as the probability distributions of political rents and the exogenous shock in both municipalities. To evaluate the quality of the incumbent, voters form expectations about the amount of rents diverted from the tax revenue. After observing tax rates in both localities, they form these expectations by weighting these values with the stochastic parameters of economic shocks and political rents. The expected value conditional on the actual values of municipality i's and j's tax rates can be derived as
In this expression, i r i denotes the covariance of the tax rate and rents in municipality i, i j the covariance of the tax rates in both jurisdictions, j r i the covariance of the tax rate in j and rents in i, and 
is the coe¢ cient of correlation of the economic shocks in both municipalities. It is restricted to be positive ( 0). indicates the economic similarity between both jurisdictions.
is a measure of the relative variance of the two stochastic variables in the model. Uncertainty about the actual realizations of rents and the economic shock are essential to the assessment of the incumbents quality.
determines the importance of information about political outcomes in municipality j for the voter's judgement in locality i. If is positive, a di¤erence between tax payments and public consumption in jurisdiction j lowers the conditional expectation of the value of rents diverted by the incumbent in municipality i in equation (4). According to equation (6), will in this case be negative. If the economic shocks are correlated and the tax payments exceed the amount of public good provided in both localities, it is more likely that this is caused by the development of the general economic situation than by rent taking of the incumbent politician.
The variance of the political rents can be interpreted as the quality of politicians in general. If 2 r is relatively large, voters face more di¢ culties in assessing their politicians'quality and politicians consider taking high rents in this case. Looking at equation (5), it is obvious that @ @ > 0. High values of 2 r thus cause the term ( i g t ) to have a large impact on the conditional expectation of political rents in equation (4).
In case of uncorrelated economic shocks ( = 0), …scal conditions in jurisdiction j ( j and g t ) do not in ‡uence the judgement of voters in municipality i. Knowledge of these values is meaningless, because di¤erences between tax payments and public consumption in both jurisdictions can solely be caused by economical disparities between these municipalities. Voters in municipality i can di¤erentiate between rents and the in ‡uence of the economy to a lesser extent. Equation (5) shows that
Even in the instance of a benevolent government, ( i g t ) has a negative impact on the voters'assessment of the incumbent's quality. Although due to recessive tendencies in the economy, the uncertainty in r it and it causes voters to infer that the government is malevolent to some extent and raise their expectation concerning rents over the initial expected value E(r it ) = 0.
If rent extraction was observable, the variance of rent collection would be 2 r = 0: This implicates = 0 and the expected value of rents conditional on the observations of the tax rates in both jurisdictions is E(r it j i ; j ) = 0: The di¤erence between tax rates and public good provision will exclusively be addressed to the existence of an economic shock. On the opposite, a high variance of political rents makes it more probable that an incumbent politician diverts personal rents from the tax revenue. In this instance, ( i g t ) has a relatively large impact on E(r it j i ; j ).
The timing of the model is as follows: At the beginning of period 1 the incumbents in localities i and j are elected. Then, the higher tier government decides over the amount of public good provided ( g t ), indepent of political decisions in the municipalities. Nature sets the value of the economic shock and the incumbent decides simultaneously on the amount of his personal rents. Tax rates are determined residually. At the end of Period 1, voters observe tax rates in both municipalities, form their expectations about the height of political rents and vote.
Voting
Political performance is not the only criterion politicians are judged upon. In addition to the amount of rents diverted from government revenue, the result of the election is in ‡uenced by a general preference for the incumbent politician in the electorate. Personal attributes of the politician in o¢ ce, a general preference for certain parties or the political atmosphere in the weeks ahead of the election can have a decisive impact on municipal elections in a federal state. These factors cannot be in ‡uence by the incumbent. Thus, the stochastic variable is introduced into the model. denotes the general preference for the incumbent and is identically and independently distributed in the interval : The distribution is uniform, the density function thus can be depicted by f ( ) = and the expected value is E( ) = 0. adopts negative values if the politician is less popular than his challenger.
The density of can be interpreted as the ideological homogeneity of the electorate. The higher , the smaller are the values can possibly exhibit. If is large, there are no extreme standpoints in the electorate. The incumbent will be reelected, if the conditional expectation of political rents less his own value of popularity is smaller than the expected rents of his opponent. The expected value of political rents of the challenger equals the initial expected value of the incumbent, E(r i ) = 0, since voters do not have further information about the political competence of the challenger. 5 The incumbent wins the election, if
Exploiting equation (4) and the fact that E(r i ) = 0, this tranforms to
Equation (9) shows the e¤ect of political rents in both localities on the election result in municipality i. A benevolent politician will set taxes only to …nance public consumption, hence in the absence of an economic shock it follows that ( i g t ) = 0. If the challenger is more popular than the incumbent, is negative. Despite his lack of popularity, the incumbent can still win the election, if the government in the other municipality extracts rents from the tax revenue. Since is always negative, inequality 9 is ful…lled if j( j g t )j < j j. Voters in municipality i observe higher taxes in the neighborhood and reward better political performance by reelecting their incumbent if the di¤erence in tax rates is high enough to compensate for the lack of popularity. Otherwise, if j j is large enough, even benevolent behavior does not guarantee reelection. If the incumbent is very unpopular, he will even be voted out of o¢ ce regardless of E(r it j i ; j ).
If the incumbent is popular, he can be con…rmed in o¢ ce if he takes tax funds for himself and the government in the contiguous jurisdiction is benevolent. Even if his political ability is likely to be worse than the ability of his opponent, voters will reelect him if j( i g t )j < j j.
Using probabilistic voting theory and the assumptions about the probability distributions of the stochastic variables, the reelection probability of the incumbent can be written as
It is obvious that a rising tax rate in municipality i lowers the reelection probability of the incumbent government, since
Tax rates in municipality j have a large impact on the outcome of the elections, if the correlation of economic shocks in both jurisdictions is high. In this case, is large and takes on large negative values. Tax rates of the contiguous municipality have a positive impact on the incumbent's probability of beeing reelected.
Political Rentseeking
The incumbent politician in municipality i decides on his personal rents r i to maximize utility according to equation (3). Using expressions (10) and (2), the incumbent's utility can be expressed as a function of political rents in both periods.
It is obvious, that the e¤ect of malversation of public funds is twofold. The incumbent derives direct utility from rent extraction in the form of the …rst term in equation (11). On the other hand, r i;1 reduces the reelection probability and thus has a negative impact on v A . Solving the …rst order condition for r i;1 , one obtains equilibrium rent extraction:
Renttaking of the politician in municipality i particularly depends on the correlation of the economic shocks , the second period rents (R + r i;2 ), the personal discount factor and the ideological homogeneity of the electorate. It is easy to show that the incumbent reduces his rents if voters are able to compare economical conditions in municipalities i and j in a better way. Di¤erentiating equation (12) with respect to , one can deduce that @r i;1 @ < 0. If both localities are hit by an economic shock in a similar way, voters will attribute di¤erences in tax rates to di¤ering rentseeking behavior rather than di¤erences in economic conditions. A rise in the tax rate of municipality i enlarges the absolute value of the di¤erences between tax payments and public consumption in both municipalities j( i g t ) + ( j g t )j. It thus increases the conditional expectation in equation (4), which reduces the probability of reelection according to equation (10). This e¤ect is increased by a rise in .
This result shows the constraint on political behavior established by the feasibillity of interjurisdictional comparison of political outcomes. If voters are able to use information on …scal variables in economically comparable municipalities, unobserved incumbent behavior can better be supervised and malevolent behavior can better be punished. Informational asymmetries between political agents and their principals are alleviated and the amount of public funds used for personal use is reduded.
This constraining e¤ect on politicians'behavior raises the utility of the electorate. Equation (1) shows that tax rates determine the utility of the voters, since voters' income and the amount of public good provided are exogenous. Lower rents ceteris paribus lead to lower tax rates (equation 2) and thus raise voters'utility in equation (1).
3 Local public …nance in Northrine-Westphalia
Introduction
Referring to classical downsian argumentation, it is assumed that rational voters approve the politician whose agenda delivers them the greatest expected utility. Voters reward their incumbent for good policies by increasing his vote share and punish him for bad policies by reducing his share of the vote. The yardstick competition literature expands this point by referring to relative evaluation of politicians. The incumbent's vote share will rise if his policies are good, relative to the political agenda in economically similar, i.e. contiguous, jurisdictions. On the other hand, the vote share of the incumbent is expected to fall if his policies are worse than the ones of politicians in the surrounding jurisdictions. The model laid out in setion 2 suggests that rising tax rates worsen the election result of the incumbent politician on the local tier of a federation. On the contrary, rising tax rates in contiguous localities are expected to raise the incumbent's share of the vote. 6 Additionally, this e¤ect is expected to be enforced by rising similarity between the municipalities.
6 Recall the interpretation of equation (10) One way to detect the existence of yardstick competition is by estimating empirical models linking the share of the vote of the incumbent government to tax rates in the own and in neighboring municipalities. Drawing on classical downsian argumentation, it is assumed that rational voters approve the politician whose agenda delivers them the greatest expected utility. Thus voters reward their incumbent for good policies by increasing his vote share and punish him for bad policies by reducing his share of the vote.
Dataset The applied dataset draws on various sources. Budget data of the years 1992 to 2005 are taken from the o¢ cial statistical o¢ ce of Northrine-Westphalia (Jahresrechnungsstatistik). Data for the budgetary year 2006 is taken from the quarterly cash statistics. The internet-based, free-acces database Informationssystem Finanzstatistik, which is maintained by the state's statistical o¢ ce, delivered municipal tax rates, tax revenue and base values of the local taxes, as well as cash credits and public debt. Electoral data is taken from the website of the state's department of the interior. A binary contiguity matrix of localities in NorthrineWestfalia was delivered by the state's statistical o¢ ce on May 8, 2008. Electoral outcomes of municipal council elections in Northrhine-Westfalia are evaluated for the years 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004. 
Empirical speci…cation
Following the reasoning of Besley and Case (1995) , Revelli (2002a) and Bosch and Solé (2004) this article employs geographical proximity as a means to measure economical similarity. In the empirical investigation, the in ‡uence of economic variables of similar jurisdictions is implemented by the unweighted average value of all neighboring jurisdictions. The Spatial Lag of a variable X is calculated by multiplying the vector of a certain variable with a spatial weights matrix. I use a row-standardised binary contiguity matrix W. This N N matrix (N being the total number of observations) contains the elements w ij = 1 P j w ij if the corresponding municipalities are neighbors and 0 otherwise. 7 The elements x i of the spatial lag X of a variable X can thus be identi…ed as x i = P n j 1 w ij x j . Drawing on Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) , the estimated model has the functional form only if the same party won the elections in t 1 and in t. T it is the vector of the analysed local taxrate, whereas P n j=1 w ij T jt represents the spatial lag of these taxrates. X it constitutes the matrix of control variables, t is a …xed time e¤ect and " it a stochastic error term.
i is a municipality and t a time index. Table 1 summarises descriptive statistics of the relevant variables. denotes the share of seats in the municipality council, won by the party which gained the most votes in the year t 1. This does not necessarily have to be the most successful party in the election in year t. Out of the 396 localities in Northrhine-Westfalia, this was the case in 51 municipalities in 1994. In 1999, the most successful party changed in 101 jurisdictions and in 2004 there was a turnover in 29 localities. Comparing this approach to Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) , the number of seats won by the governing coalition cannot be utilized, because on the local government level in Northrhine-Westfalia, council and mayor are independently elected. Thus, the position of the mayor does not depend on a majority in the assembly, rendering …xed coalitions between parties to elect the executive irrelevant. 8 In german municipalities, politicians often decide according to their position towards the subject rather than their party a¢ liation. Correspondingly, testable data on decision behavior is not available and it is impossible to gain information about which party actually sets the political agenda. As a proxy for incumbency, this paper uses the party which gained the largest fraction of seats in the council in the election in t 1. In all but six cases in the dataset the party with the most seats has either been the Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The exceptions have been local parties that mostly won the election by emphasizing an agenda uniquely important for the municipality.
9
Local Tax Rates This article uses local tax rates to deliver evidence for the relevance of the yardstick competition hypothesis in local …scal politics. Local tax revenue consists of the municipal share of the federal income and value added tax, as well as the revenue of the business and property taxes. Property taxes are twofold: Property tax A is levied on agricultural acreage and property tax B is paid for private real estate. Another minor source of income are certain local consumption taxes and fees like the hunting tax, dog license fee or the second residence tax.
10
To detect the existence of yardstick competition, the only tax rates of interest are the ones which are likely to be recognised as locally determined tax rates by a majority of the voters. The general income and value added taxes are set by the federal government which makes them likely not to be used as an evaluation criterion of the quality of local politicians. Local governments derive only a small fraction of their total revenue out of local consumption taxes and fees, so these are weak indicators for incumbent policy evaluation as well.
11 German local governments have the 8 An alternative Method of modelling the election outcome is employed by Case (1993) . In her contribution, the dependent variable is a dummyvariable indicating whether the incumbent was reelected. 9 In the municipality of Beelen, the free voters union (FWG) is traditionally the strongest party. In the municipal council elections 1989, 1994 and 2004 it gained the largest share of the vote. In 1999 the CDU and the FWG won the same number of seats in the assembly. However, since the FWG drew a larger share of the vote, it is considered incumbent in the period between 1999 and 2004. In the small town of Schalksmühle the independent voters union (UWG) gained the most seats in all four elections. In Hallenberg, the citizen's list (BL) drew 18 of 21 seats in the assembly in 1989 and in Hallenthal, the citizens' association turned out to be the winner of the election. Voters punished the well-established politicians for an unfavorable sewage policy. 10 For a more detailed description of German local taxes, see Innenministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (2007), p.16.
11 According to Schwarting (1999) , in the late 1990s, the share of revenue collected by these taxes amounted to less than 2 percent of total german municipal revenue. right to add a municipal tax rate on federal business and property tax rates. These rates vary widely between local jurisdictions, making them reasonable indicators for local political behavior. In the econometric analysis, the key explanatory variables thus are local business and property tax rates T it and their respective spatial lags P n j=1 w ij T jt .
Hypotheses Considering the results of the theoretical model laid out above, one can presume that rising tax rates in the municipality should have a negative e¤ect on the election result of the strongest party. Voters punish politicians in charge for setting high tax rates. According to the yardstick competition hypothesis, the levels of tax rates in the surrounding localities are taken into account by the voters when evaluating tax policy. If the neighbors set high tax rates as well, the election result of the incumbent party should be better than in the opposite case.
12
Control Variables Obviously the election result does also depend on factors independent of local tax policy. To control for these in ‡uences, several control variables are included into the regression equation. First, behavioral voting is controlled for by using the share of the seats obtained in the election in t 1 by the strongest party in the election S [t 1;t] i(t 1) . As indicated in the model above, the electorate tends to have a general ideological preference for a certain party and the election result in a municipality is likely to be biased towards one of the parties running for o¢ ce.
Since GDP data is not available for municipalities in Northrhine-Westfalia, the base value of the local business tax is incorporated into the model to account for the in ‡uence of changes in the population's wealth. 13 It seems reasonable to expect a positive impact on the election result. Following Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) , per capita total expenditure is used as a proxy for the quantity and quality of public services in the municipality. High expenditures should thus have a positive impact on the election result of the incumbent party. Analogous to the local tax rates, it is assumed that voters compare the level of public services in their own municipality with that in neighboring jurisdictions. This e¤ect is controlled for by using the spatial lag of per capita expenditures in the regression equation.
Additionally, a dummy for the cities not organised in a county (kreisfreie Städte) and an indicator for government fragmentation are used in the empirical model. By constucting this Her…ndahl-Index, the article refers to Ashworth et al. (2005) using
with p i being the seat share of party i in the municipal council. If the distribution of seats in the council is balanced, this indicator takes on a high value. In this case, the voters face more di¢ culties to di¤erentiate between the in ‡uence of the di¤erent parties on policy outcomes. Accordingly, …scal policy in general is expected to have a lower in ‡uence on the election result of the party with the largest share of seats. Finally, I include year e¤ects into the equation. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables.
Endogeneity problems Empirical models using local tax rates usually face endogeneity problems. Consider an incumbent party, which faces a popularity de…cit during the pre-election campaign, possibly caused by events on the federal political arena which are not controlled for in the regression equation. If political decisionmakers lower tax rates to compensate for their lack of popularity and thus raise the probability of being reelected, the local tax rate will be correlated with the error term and the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators will be biased accordingly. 14 I follow Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) , Revelli (2006) and Revelli (2002a) by using Two Stage Least Squares estimation methods to account for this problem. The local tax rates are instrumented by the share of the young (under 15) and the elderly (over 65 years old), as in Besley and Case (1995) and Revelli (2002a) . Besley and Case (1995) point out, that there might be an e¤ect of changes in the share of old people on the election result in the municipality. The results of the statistical tests indicate that the instruments used are valid. The instrumental variables thus seem to be correlated with local public expenditure and the local tax rates, but they are not correlated with the election result.
In the empirical investigation, OLS-, Fixed E¤ects (FE)-and 2SLS-regression methods with …xed time e¤ects are used. Fixed municipality e¤ects are not included in the equation, because they are likely to distort regressors which are not strictly exogenous. Especially a lagged endogenous variable used as a regressor is certainly not strictly exogenous. 15 As indicated by Arellano and Bond (1991) , this requires a transformation of the data and estimation in …rst di¤erences. However, taking …rst di¤erences causes the lagged election result to correlate with the error term, a problem which can be solved by instrumenting the seat share by its second order time lag. In the context of local public …nance in Northrhine-Westphalia, the data is not available for a time period long enough to apply this approach. On the other hand, as pointed out above, S for observations in which the most successful party in t 1 was not the winner of the election in t 2. In the municipal council elections of 1994, this was the case for 51 of the 396 localities in Northrhine-Westfalia. In 1999, the winner changed in 101 jurisdictions and in 2004 this was the case in 29 municipalities. Taking this into account, the endogeneity problem of the estimation equation applied is largely reduced.
Spatial correlation in business tax rates To asses spatial correlation in local business tax rates in Northrhine-Westfalia, the Moran statistic is calculated for all observations in the dataset by using the same row-standardised spatial weights matrix as outlined above. Table 2 shows, that the null hypothesis of spatial independence can be rejected on a signi…cance level of 1%. There seems to be considerable spatial correlation in the local business tax rates of the election years 1994, 1999 and 2004. 16 Other ways of testing for spatial correlation are Moran I and Lagrange Multiplier tests on the residuals of the OLS-estimation of the model
In this model, T it resembles the business tax rate of municipality i at time t, X it the vector of control variables in period t and " it the residuals to be tested. 17 The results of the tests summarized in table 3 suggest a spatial correlation in the business tax rates in Northrhine-Westfalia to actually be existent. In line with the reasoning in Allers and Elhorst (2005) , these tests indicate that modelling the spatial interaction in the dataset by applying a spatial lag of the explanatory variable is better than modelling a spatially correlated error term. 
Business Tax Rate
The results of the OLS-, FE-and 2SLS-regressions of the spatial lag business tax rate models are displayed in table 4. Column 1 contains the coe¢ cients of the OLSregressors, the standard errors are shown in parentheses. The incumbent party's result at the past election polls has a positive and highly signi…cant e¤ect on the seat share in the present election. The own tax rate's coe¢ cient is negative as expected and signi…cant on a 1% level. Raising local tax rates leads to a drop in the seat share of the most successful party. The spatial lag of the business tax rate has a positive impact on the election result, but is not signi…cant at any conventional level. Per capita public expenditure and the base value of the local business tax are highly signi…cant but negative, which is counterintuitive. This could be explained by the fact that both variables are weak proxies for the quality of public services and municipal wealth, respectively. Public expenditure in contiguous jurisdictions is not signi…cant, but shows the expected sign. The dummies for cities and the …xed time e¤ects are signi…cant at 5% levels and the index for government fragmentation has a signi…cant negative e¤ect on the election result of the party with the largest seat share. This last result is not surprising, since the possibility that the incumbent party holds a large seat share is bigger in less fragmented governments. The coe¢ cients of the …xed e¤ects regressions are shown in column 2 of table 4. The results resemble the ones of the OLS regressions. The coe¢ cient of the seat share in the last election is positive and highly signi…cant. Own business tax rates show the expected sign, but are not signi…cant. The indicator for municipal wealth is negative and signi…cant as well and the results for government fragmentation, the year e¤ects and public expenditure of contiguous municipalities are consistent with the OLS estimates. The FE-estimate of own expenditure shows the expected sign and is signi…cant at a 5% level. The endogeneity tests of Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) are rejected on a signi…cance level of 1%. This indicates, that the OLS estimates are inconsistent and the explanatory variables have to be instrumented. The third column presents the coe¢ cients of the 2SLS regression. Business tax rates are instrumented by the total population share of young and elderly. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test cannot be rejected on a 5% signi…cance level. The instruments thus seem to be valid. The low p-value of the Anderson Likelihood Ratio tests indicates identi…cation of the regression equation.
The 2SLS estimator of the past election result is positive and signi…cant, showing that long term popularity e¤ects in ‡uence election outcomes in NorthrhineWestfalias municipalities. The most important result of the investigation are the expected signs and signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of the business tax rate and its spatial lag. Own tax rates lower the share of seats gained by the strongest party while rising tax rates in the neighbouring localities have a positive impact on the election result. This proves the existence of yardstick competition in tax rate setting in Northrine-Westfalia. Local politicians are punished for setting high tax rates, but voters use information about …scal policy in contiguous jurisdictions when assessing their political decisionmakers.
The coe¢ cients of all other variables in the 2SLS-estimation are signi…cant at least on a 5% level. Per capita public expenditure has the expected positive e¤ect on the election outcome. Its spatial lag has a negative coe¢ cient, leading to the conclusion, that voters compare …scal policy on the expenditure side as well. The Dummies for large cities, the year e¤ect and the index of government fragmentation are all signi…cant on a 5% level. Table 5 displays the results of the estimations of the property tax rate model. They are similar compared to those of the business tax rate model. In the 2SLS estimation, the property tax rate shows a signi…cant negative e¤ect on the election outcome, whereas the spatial lag of the property tax rate indicates a positive e¤ect on the election result of the strongest party in the municipality council. If politicians 
Property tax rate
Conclusion
This paper presents a simple yardstick competition model and tested the basic hypothesis using a panel data set containing public budget and electoral data of the German state of Northrhine-Westfalia. The theoretical part of the essay employs probabilistic voting theory to show that politicians reduce exploitative …scal policy when voters are able to use information about …scal variables in similar jurisdictions. Decisionmakers know about the importance of their political performance relative to the policy of their counterparts in contiguous municipalities. In equilibrium, personal renttaking of the incumbent politician is reduced by increased economic similarity between the localities in the model.
The theoretical result is supported by the results of the empirical investigation. Using a panel data set containing government budget …gures of the election years 1989 , 1994 , 1999 estimations have shown that raising business or property tax rates reduces the amount of seats gained by the leading party in the council. However, the election result improves with rising tax rates in contiguous municipalities. This proves that voters use information about …scal policy in neighboring municipalities to better assess their politicians' competence when deciding about which party to vote in municipal council elections. Local politicians thus engage in yardstick competition when setting municipal tax rates. 
